Quadratic Voting + Reputation Weighting
The formula
A voter i's effective vote weight on any proposal is:
Where staked_POP_i is i's currently staked $POP, and r_i ∈ [0, 1] is their Reputation Score.
Why quadratic
Pure token-weighted voting is plutocratic: a 100x holder has 100x influence. Quadratic voting (Lalley & Weyl, 2018) dampens this:
| Token holding | Linear weight | Quadratic weight |
|---|---|---|
| 1 $POP | 1 | 1 |
| 100 $POP | 100 | 10 |
| 10,000 $POP | 10,000 | 100 |
| 1,000,000 $POP | 1,000,000 | 1,000 |
A whale must hold 1M $POP to get 1,000x the voting weight of a small holder — versus 1M× in linear voting. This preserves whale influence (they have more than small holders) without granting outright veto power.
Why reputation-weighted
Pure quadratic voting can be Sybil-attacked: split a holding across 100 sub-accounts to multiply effective weight. Reputation gating defeats this: each sub-account's reputation r_i would need to be cultivated independently over time, at marginal cost roughly matching the linear-voting whale weight. The Sybil multiplier collapses.
Worked example
Three voters on a proposal:
| Voter | Staked $POP | Linear weight | Quadratic weight | Reputation r_i | Effective w_i |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Whale | 1,000,000 | 1,000,000 | 1,000 | 0.6 | 600 |
| Mid holder | 10,000 | 10,000 | 100 | 0.9 | 90 |
| Small holder | 100 | 100 | 10 | 0.85 | 8.5 |
The whale has ~7x the weight of the mid holder, not 100x. The small holder has measurable weight (8.5 vs whale's 600 = ~1.4%) — much better than the 0.01% they'd have in linear voting.
Staking
To cast a vote, $POP must be staked. Staking is a lock that:
- Lasts at least the proposal's voting period (7 days).
- Cannot be unstaked during an active vote on any proposal the user voted on.
- Earns a share of protocol fee distribution (see Value Accrual).
Unstaking has a 7-day unbonding period (cooldown). This prevents flash-loan governance attacks (acquire massive position, vote, exit immediately).
Reputation in governance
Reputation Score is the same r_i used in Round settlement (see Cryptographic Protocol). It reflects historical honesty and protocol engagement. Importantly:
- New accounts have
r_i = 0.5. They can vote, but with half weight. - Long-term honest participants approach
r_i = 0.99. They get near-full weight. - Accounts flagged for malicious behavior have
r_i → 0. They effectively cannot vote.
This means governance influence is earned through sustained protocol engagement, not just bought.
Founders Club governance bootstrap
For the first 6 months post-TGE, Founders Club members (L7) have 2x voting weight. This is a structural defense against governance capture by exchanges or large early buyers who could acquire $POP at TGE but not Reputation Score. After 6 months, the bonus expires.
Limitations
- Voter turnout: typical DAO turnout is ~5–15% of holders. We design assuming this baseline.
- Whale collusion: explicit collusion among whales is not prevented; quadratic only dampens individual whale weight.
- Reputation gaming: an adversary could try to inflate Reputation through Round participation specifically to vote later. This is expensive but possible; we accept it as a design trade-off.
References
- Lalley, S.P., Weyl, E.G. (2018). Quadratic Voting: How Mechanism Design Can Radicalize Democracy. AEA P&P 108.
- Buterin, V., Hitzig, Z., Weyl, E.G. (2019). A Flexible Design for Funding Public Goods.