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Oracle & Randomness ​

CashPop selects each Round's question from a reservoir of >100,000 pre-curated questions. The selection must be:

  1. Unpredictable before the Round starts (so no insider can pre-coordinate a chosen answer).
  2. Auditable after the Round ends (so any third party can re-verify the selection).
  3. Manipulation-resistant against any single oracle's compromise.

The seed construction ​

The question seed for Round t is:

σt=H(σt−1∥rtDRAND∥rtTON-VRF)

Where:

  • σ_{t-1} is the previous Round's seed (provides causal chaining).
  • r^{DRAND}_t is the latest beacon output from the DRAND public randomness network (League of Entropy: Cloudflare, Protocol Labs, EPFL, etc.).
  • r^{TON-VRF}_t is a TON-native VRF output from a permissionless validator set.

The seed selects the question via:

qt=Q[σtmod|Q|]

Why hybrid DRAND + TON-VRF ​

A single randomness source has a single point of compromise. By combining two independently-administered sources via concatenation and hash:

  • An adversary controlling DRAND alone cannot bias the seed.
  • An adversary controlling TON-VRF alone cannot bias the seed.
  • An adversary would need to compromise both simultaneously for a Round's worth of beacon (a vanishingly low probability for two independent threshold-secured systems).

DRAND uses BLS threshold signatures across 10+ public validators with rotating drand-keys. TON-VRF uses TON's elected validator set's threshold signature. The two systems share no operators, no infrastructure, no software supply chain.

DRAND beacon details ​

  • Beacon frequency: every 3 seconds (League of Entropy mainnet).
  • Beacon size: 32 bytes.
  • Verification: BLS12-381 signature, public key published; anyone can verify a beacon offline.
  • Lookback: CashPop uses the most recent beacon with timestamp ≥ Round start.

TON-VRF details ​

  • Implementation: derived from validator's BLS signature on Round start hash.
  • Verification: BLS signature against published validator pubkey rotation.
  • Lookback: the VRF output corresponding to the master-chain block at Round start.

Question reservoir generation pipeline ​

LLM ensemble {L1, L2, L3, ...} generate candidates
              ↓
Adversarial debiasing (linguistic priming removal)
              ↓
Calibration pretest (synthetic-population simulator estimates response distribution ρ̂)
              ↓
Filter: |ρ̂ - 0.5| > τ → discard
              ↓
Human-in-loop quality review (sampled 1% of candidates)
              ↓
Hash and commit to reservoir merkle tree
              ↓
Reservoir batch published on-chain (committed monthly)

The monthly reservoir publication means the question pool is publicly auditable: anyone can verify that question q_t selected on date d was indeed part of the reservoir committed before d.

Why adversarial debiasing ​

Naively-generated questions tend to carry priming patterns from the LLM's training data — Western-cultural assumptions, gender-coded language, age-implicit references. We rewrite candidates to remove such priming (techniques from Bolukbasi et al., 2016; Caliskan et al., 2017). The goal is questions whose response distribution depends on the population being polled, not on how the question is phrased.

Why calibration pretest ​

The Beauty Contest game is most informative when the strategic uncertainty is highest — i.e., when the population's expected response is closest to 50/50. We discard low-entropy questions (where most populations would obviously go one way) because they make the game trivial. The threshold τ is in the range [0.05, 0.15] depending on game mode.

Failure modes and graceful degradation ​

FailureDetectionResponse
DRAND beacon timeoutDRAND health check (every 30s)Pause Rounds, alert ops
TON-VRF validator timeoutTON masterchain monitorPause Rounds, alert ops
Reservoir desyncMerkle root mismatchHalt Round; manual re-sync from canonical store
LLM pipeline poisoningStatistical anomaly detection on calibration distributionsQuarantine batch; human review

The system fails safe: in any oracle failure, Rounds pause, no settlement occurs, no rewards are paid. Escrowed funds are recoverable to users by emergency multisig vote.

Verifiability checklist for skeptics ​

A third-party auditor at any time can:

  1. Fetch the on-chain seed history.
  2. Fetch the published reservoir Merkle root for that month.
  3. Fetch the corresponding DRAND beacon and TON-VRF output for that Round timestamp.
  4. Re-compute σ_t = H(σ_{t-1} ‖ DRAND ‖ TON-VRF) and verify it matches the on-chain commit.
  5. Re-compute q_t = Reservoir[σ_t mod |Q|] and verify it matches the question delivered.

If any step fails, the Round is void and a dispute is filed.

Built on TON.